What more correctly describes the nature of the world, something that defies change more along the way Parmenides/Zeno has ‘Tortoise & Achilles’ show us that change is actually illusory or something that embraces change and all its multifariousness as a principle in itself like Nietzsche’s ‘Will to Power’? How do we interpret that if it’s viewed as possibly ultimately unavoidable, are there naturally inhering shapes to change? Ontologically are there principles that are themselves higher than the process of change itself notwithstanding the way that something may be logically situated; does an ontology of change yet always bring itself back to a ‘hermeneutic mirror’ which must always seek a continuity of some sort in that? What would the nature of such continuity be like, does our perspective of change itself change or is there some guide whereby that might be continuously understood if not actually controlled or predicted the way that we would the weather or some other phenomenon of the natural world subject to inductive reasoning? What is the basic continuity of change if it is not something understood as a natural process but more, a ongoing shift in ideology that can only be argumentatively understood but not manipulated numerically?
For Nietzsche the Dionysus is the prevailing mood of the historical process, sort of a heady self-devouring melee of sickness, strength and a beatitude of the ‘real’; here he makes a lengthy rhapsody over that
And do you know what “the world” is to me? Shall I show you in my mirror? This world: a monster of energy, without beginning, without end; a firm, iron magnitude of force that does not grow bigger or smaller, that does not expend itself but only transforms itself; as a whole, of unalterable size, a household without expenses or losses, but likewise without increase or income; enclosed by a “nothingness” as by a boundary; not something blurry or wasted, not something endlessly extended, but set in a definite space as a definite force, and not a space that might be “empty” here or there, but rather as force throughout, as a play of forces and waves of forces, at the same time one and many, increasing here and at the same time decreasing there; a sea of flowing and rushing together, eternally changing, eternally flooding back, with tremendous years of recurrence, with an ebb and flow of its forms…This world is will to power–and nothing besides WP pg.550
Pure, ceaseless change is sufficient for his view though the attitude of the power of the world itself as a principle to compel an unending creative process to cohere is the overriding idea to be found there; but does the meaning of that get extended further than pure creativity, which is to say what goes beyond merely something made in the image of a continually evolving and devolving strength? Is there anything that could be conceived outward of a continuity of power, is there more perspective possible than just that? What would that be made up of, if any?
So change is a reality but to contend that change is the ultimate reality or that “everything is relative” itself has difficulties, there’s a problem logically with the attitude that ‘change does not have an, end’ which is what Hans-Georg Gadamer calls into play as he brings the subject back to Heidegger
That the thesis of skepticism or relativism refutes itself to the extent that it claims to be true is an irrefutable argument. But what does it achieve? The reflective argument that proves successful here rebounds against the arguer, for it renders the truth value of the reflection suspect. It is not the reality of skepticism or of truth-dissolving relativism but the truth claim of all formal arguments that is affected. BT pg. 229/Truth and Method pg.340
He goes somewhat further to describe the way an ontological assertion and one based in a more linguistically semantic understanding differ
“we cannot argue that a historicism that maintains the historical conditionedness of all knowledge “for all eternity” is basically self-contradictory. This kind of contradiction is a special problem. Here we must also ask whether the two propositions–“all knowledge is historically conditioned” and “this piece of knowledge is true unconditionally”–are on the same level so that they could contradict each other. For the thesis is not that this proposition will always be considered true, any more than that it has always been so considered. Rather, historicism that takes itself seriously will allow for the fact that one day its thesis will no longer be considered true–i.e., that people will think “unhistorically.” And yet not because asserting that all knowledge is conditioned is meaningless and “logically” contradictory.” Truth and Method pg. 530
So there is a way that something may be ontologically founded and yet semantically untenable, which is simply that change is real, not a representative figment of language. Change is not a mirage, and to describe it as something that cannot be historically attributed to and greater than any given piece of language that describes that is fundamentally where that persists. Change is not language, change is not the knowledge of that; our knowledge of the meaning of that can exceed what we may actually say about it at any given point or even as a whole. So a perspective beyond pure change does in fact occur, which is that we may somewhere begin to view ‘being’ as something that is no longer part of the historical process; historically, perspective exceeds the way that may actually be referred to.